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Presidential Power in United States

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[Article by Sergey Mikhaylovich Samuylov, candidate of historical sciences and scientific associate at Institute of U.S. and Canadian Studies]

[Text] *All of them believe in democracy until they get into the White House. Then they begin believing in the need for dictatorial power, because it is too difficult to achieve the implementation of their programs otherwise—one of President J. Kennedy's assistants.*

The introduction of a presidency in the Soviet Union has quite understandably aroused interest in how this institution functions in the United States, and in how efficiently it functions. After all, for two centuries, the American presidency has been developing, so to speak, within the framework of the classical system of the separation of powers and has undergone a complex and multifaceted evolution during this period.

In one short article, of course, it would be impossible to present a comprehensive analysis of a phenomenon as complex and multifaceted as the institution of presidential power. For this reason, we will confine ourselves to an examination of the president's main constitutional prerogatives, their exercise in contemporary political practices, and some aspects of the relationship between the executive and legislative branches in U.S. history.

The Head of the Federal Executive Branch

The constitutional status of the president of the United States requires him to play three roles simultaneously. He is the chief of state, the chief executive (head of the cabinet), and the commander in chief of the country's armed forces. It was no coincidence that the "Founding Fathers" of the United States endowed the president with such sweeping powers.

We should recall that the United States was originally formed as a confederation of 13 former English colonies with a weak central government. In this confederated form and without a presidency, the "perpetual union" lasted only a few years and proved to be completely lacking in vitality. In particular, the confederation led to the effective collapse of the financial system and, as a result, to dissatisfaction and armed uprisings among the lower social strata. The Constitution of 1787 consolidated a union with a federated structure and a much stronger central government, a system for the horizontal (legislative, executive, and judiciary) and vertical (federal and state) separation of powers, and a presidency, endowed with full executive authority. Before the president takes office, he takes the following oath: "I do

solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully execute the office of president of the United States, and will to the best of my ability, preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution of the United States."¹

The main constitutional powers of the president are listed in Article II of the Constitution. Article I deals with the Congress, which was, according to the "Founding Fathers" plans, supposed to serve as the leading legislative body of the federal government. Throughout the 19th century, with the exception of the Civil War years (1861-1865), the Congress exercised more governmental authority than the president.² The situation has changed dramatically in this century, and this will be discussed below.

The president is paid a salary (200,000 dollars a year), which, according to the Constitution, cannot be increased or decreased during his 4 years in office. Besides this, he receives \$50,000 (taxable) for additional expenses and \$100,000 (nontaxable) for travel expenses. After the president leaves office, he is paid a lifetime pension in the amount of \$63,000 a year³ and is eligible for some other privileges.

As the head of the executive branch, the president has jurisdiction over the huge staff of the federal executive departments and agencies, consisting of more than 3 million civil servants. This huge bureaucratic pyramid consists of a top layer, changed when a new party takes charge—the administration (including around 600 politically significant offices, the candidates for which are appointed by the president or his assistants, with or without the "advice and consent" of the Senate)—and the huge army of career public servants occupying official federal positions. They warrant more detailed discussion because they play an important role in the exercise of presidential power. In the United States they are commonly called "career bureaucrats." They gradually climb the professional ladder from the lowest to the highest rungs, receiving an annual salary of around \$60,000-\$80,000 when they reach the top. The 1883 Civil Service Act prohibits the dismissal or harassment of a career public servant for political reasons by the president or by a political appointee. The same law requires the career bureaucrats to display political neutrality toward the current administration. Any federal employee, including the president, is prohibited by law from using federal agencies to affect or influence voting procedures, campaigns, and elections.

On the institutional level the president has jurisdiction over the Executive Office of the President, representing a set of supra-departmental agencies (the White House Office, the National Security Council, the Office of Management and Budget, the Council of Economic Advisers, and others), 13 federal departments, the heads of which make up most of the cabinet and are legally accountable to Congress, and more than 50 independent regulatory agencies, councils, and commissions. The overwhelming majority of federal employees are scattered throughout the states. The ones in Washington and

the Federal District of Columbia generally represent the upper echelon of the career bureaucracy and the central staff of departments and agencies, consisting of more than 300,000 employees.

Officially, all federal employees are under the president's jurisdiction. In reality, the situation is much more complex. The top career bureaucrats, along with the congressional staff and the so-called "special interest groups," essentially make up a single bureaucratic entity with a great deal of administrative authority and its own corporative interests and personnel staff, all of which undergo little change when a new administration takes office. The top career bureaucrats are often much more loyal to their colleagues in this "tripartite alliance" than to the administration in office. In other words, they enjoy considerable autonomy, and a president and administration intending to implement their own political programs have to consider the interests and power of this administrative stratum, especially the top-level bureaucrats.⁴ In other words, the unofficial power structure includes certain vertical "checks and balances" of presidential power within the federal executive branch itself.

The Chief Diplomat and Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces

The constitution concentrates the administration of foreign policy in the president's hands. He has the prerogative, "to make treaties, provided two-thirds of the senators present concur; and he shall nominate, and by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, shall appoint ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls" (Article II, section 2). These powers effectively assign the president the role of the country's chief diplomat. The president also has the power to conclude international treaties in the form of executive agreements not requiring Senate approval. He has the right to grant or withhold recognition of foreign governments.

The concentration of foreign policy prerogatives in the federal administration's hands is consistent with one of the basic principles of American government—the principle of federalism. The constitutions of the separate states prohibit them from maintaining their own armed forces, with the exception of the National Guard and police, engaging in foreign policy activity, and printing their own currency.⁵

The president works closely with the Congress in the planning and pursuit of foreign policy. Major foreign policy decisions often represent a complex, multilateral compromise between the interests of the president, his allies in Congress, the competing bureaucracies of various foreign policy agencies, and political groups outside the government, and public opinion.⁶

As the commander in chief of the country's armed forces, the president personifies another important principle of government—the supremacy of civilians over the military even in the sphere of defense. One of the vivid illustrations of this principle was the dismissal of

General D. MacArthur from his post as commander in chief of the UN troops by President H. Truman during the war in Korea in 1951.⁷

The following are some of the most famous examples of actions taken by presidents as commanders in chief in the postwar period:

Kennedy's authorization of the armed invasion of Cuba in the Bay of Pigs in 1961;

Johnson's personal selection and approval of targets for bombing in North Vietnam in the 1960s;

Nixon's decisions to begin the secret bombing of neutral Cambodia for the purpose of eliminating the supply bases of Vietnamese rebels in 1969, to authorize an invasion of Cambodia by American ground forces for the same purpose in 1970, and others;

Reagan's decisions on the armed invasion of Grenada and the overthrow of its government in 1983 and on the bombing of Libyan cities in 1986;

Finally, President Bush's decision on the armed invasion of Panama and the overthrow of its government in December 1989.

The constitution assigns Congress the power to declare war, to raise and support an army, and to create and maintain a navy. Throughout American history the presidents have used the armed forces abroad many times (around 200 times) without any declaration of a war by Congress. Even if these actions signified flagrant violations of international law and human rights but created or promised to create strong public support for the president within the country, the presidents resorted to military force without much hesitation, ignoring world public opinion and citing national interests as the justification for these actions. This was the case in Vietnam, when Nixon's "silent majority" made its wishes known, resulting in the protraction of American involvement in the war for several more years by the president, and this was also the case in Grenada, during the bombing of Libya, and just recently in Panama....

The president can also act as the commander in chief within the country in emergencies. The constitution stipulates that the federal administration will guarantee each state a "republican form of government" and, at the request of the state, will also protect it against "domestic violence" (Article IV, section 4).⁸ Officially, this would seem to go against the main postulates of federalism: The sovereignty of the federation should extend to all of its territory; in the event of conflicts between federal and state laws, only the former will be enforced. The constitutional provision implies, however, that if the rights of citizens in a state are being violated due to "domestic violence" and the state government refuses to protect these rights, the federal government will be unable to

intervene for the restoration of order. In reality, however, the president is endowed with these powers as the commander in chief. They are enumerated in the United States Code.

By law, the president has the right to call the National Guard and regular army units into service himself, without waiting for a request from state officials, in any state if he feels that the "unlawful actions of organizations or associations or rebellion against government officials of the United States" will make the enforcement of federal laws in the state impossible.⁹

Besides this, the president is empowered to use military force at his own discretion to suppress "any rebellion, domestic violence, illegal organizations, or conspiracies" in any state if they prevent the enforcement of state and federal laws and if any part of the population of the state is deprived of the rights guaranteed by the constitution and the law and "state officials cannot or will not protect these rights."¹⁰

Therefore, although the constitution does not expressly say that the president will guarantee the enforcement of federal and state laws but merely says that he "shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed," in accordance with federal laws and the constitutional prerogatives of the commander in chief, he actually is this guarantor (jointly with state officials, of course, in the case of state laws). In the postwar period, especially in the late 1950s and the 1960s, when racial unrest had seized many American cities, the presidents repeatedly exercised their military powers on the basis of executive orders or directives on the compulsory execution of federal court decisions, particularly to stop the violent actions of racists when schools and universities in the southern states were being desegregated. These powers were exercised several times at the request of governors of states to suppress rioting, looting, and violence in the cities.

Legislator, Lobbyist, and Party Leader

Another of the president's important functions is the legislative function. The constitution does not endow the president directly with the right of legislative initiative, but in the postwar period his legislative role has grown much stronger. The president's duties now include the preparation and submission of a draft federal budget for congressional consideration. The budget is drafted by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB).

The president's budget message to the Congress is broadcast to the whole nation and plays an important role in generating voter support for the president's program and in exerting pressure on Congress from below. Ronald Reagan used this tactic successfully in the beginning of the 1980s, when he quickly won congressional approval of his economic program, which was innovative for that time and which was later known as "Reaganomics." This program, which stipulated substantial cuts in the federal government's social programs—i.e., the reduction of the power of the previously mentioned "tripartite alliances" in the

domestic policy sphere—naturally encountered fierce resistance from them. To a considerable extent, this resistance was one of the main reasons for the numerous political scandals, exposures, and obligatory resignations of some members of the Reagan administration.

The Executive Office of the President and, incidentally, all other federal agencies have special congressional liaisons, one of whose main duties consists in the daily monitoring of the congressional status of bills of particular importance to the administration. When the fate of an important bill is in question, the president and his assistants employ all of the political levers at their disposal, including personal contacts, conversations, promises of favors of various kinds to legislators, etc. In essence, in these situations the president and his assistants act as the main collective lobbyist in dealings with Congress. We can agree with R. Neustadt, the American expert on presidential power, that the main method of presidential action, under the conditions of the separation of powers, consists in persuasion. The president has to persuade the American legislators that the implementation of his political program will be consistent with their duties and with the public interest.¹¹

The constitution does not mention one of the president's most important political functions—the leadership of his party. The American two-party system and electoral process are set up in such a way that the presidential candidate of a party (Democratic or Republican) effectively becomes the party leader as soon as he is nominated as the candidate at the party convention and then generally nominates a new candidate for chairman of his party's national committee. The first phase of the election campaign (the primaries) consists precisely in singling out one of several party leaders with the greatest chances of winning the presidential election. The party subsequently rallies round him, his team, and his platform.

After the president has been elected, he continues to oversee a substantial portion of party affairs. Furthermore, all of his activities are aimed primarily at securing his own re-election and keeping his party in power. Understandably, the president seeks support for the congressional passage of certain bills primarily in his own party faction in both houses and among the state governors belonging to his party. It is much easier for a president to win approval for his bills when his party controls the majority in the Congress and, consequently, the congressional committees. The fact that the majority of Senate seats belonged to the Republican Party during the first 6 years of Reagan's presidency facilitated the implementation of his economic program. In the 1980s, however, there was an increasingly strong tendency to elect a member of the Republican Party president while electing members of the opposition Democratic Party to the majority of seats in the Congress as a whole and in the House of Representatives, the membership of which is proportional to the population of each state. This kind of "divided" government introduces the additional element of party competition into the relations between the

executive and legislative branches. On the one hand, this certainly strengthens the principle of the separation of powers and, on the other, it makes it extremely difficult for the president to carry out any sweeping, radical political programs.

Incidentally, even the Reagan administration experienced this. The cuts in social programs were only possible on a limited scale, and this was due less to the corporative interests of the "tripartite alliances" than to the feelings of the majority of American voters. The young and energetic director of the OMB, D. Stockman, who had been one of the main strategists and lobbyists of "Reaganomics," had to admit, after 5 years in office and after numerous political battles with Congress, that "the unsuccessful Reagan revolution proved that the American voting public wants moderate social democracy (social protection in the form of federal welfare programs—S.S.) to protect them from the worst characteristics of capitalism."¹² Because members of the Democratic Party have the ideological outlook providing the strongest guarantee of this, the majority of voters have supported Democrats in congressional elections.

Presidency and Democracy

One of the main conditions of the preservation of parliamentary democracy in any country consists in reliable constitutional guarantees against the exercise of dictatorial authority by the executive branch. These guarantees are envisaged in the American Constitution in the form of the impeachment process.¹³

The historical precedent of the rapid and almost uncontrollable reinforcement of executive authority through the use of legislative prerogatives in emergencies was set by A. Lincoln. Under the extraordinary circumstances of the Civil War between the North and the South, the president increased the size of the army dramatically and declared a state of emergency without seeking congressional authorization, used treasury funds at his own discretion, abolished slavery, and suspended some constitutional guarantees of civil rights. It is indicative that the Supreme Court of the United States unequivocally supported the president's actions.

Extraordinary circumstances, especially in wartime, can lead to the rapid reinforcement of executive authority in any democratic state, to the point of the possible establishment of a dictatorship. To minimize this danger, the "Founding Fathers" of the United States envisaged a procedure for the early removal of officials, including the president, from office. They are removed from office "on impeachment for treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors" (Article II, section 4).¹⁴ The constitution gives the House of Representatives the exclusive right to institute impeachment proceedings. The articles of impeachment against an official are drawn up and approved by a simple majority vote of the House. The Senate acts as a court of law in these proceedings. At the end of the trial, the Senate issues its verdict. A two-thirds vote of the senators present is necessary for conviction.

The punishment is confined to removal from office, after which the individual may be tried in a regular court of law.

In the course of American history, impeachment proceedings have been instituted only against one president. In 1868 charges were preferred against President A. Johnson. He was accused of the unlawful removal of the secretary of war from office. He was acquitted by the margin of a single vote in the Senate.

In this century the presidency was strengthened considerably when the center of power in the federal government shifted clearly in its direction. The process was particularly rapid in the 1930s, when F. Roosevelt was president. The quick and extensive expansion of federal government intervention in the socioeconomic sphere began in the New Deal years, when many new federal departments and agencies were created. Despite the fierce opposition of conservatives and monopolies, Roosevelt made government regulation of socioeconomic affairs in the country the norm.¹⁵

The actual military and foreign policy prerogatives of the president were augmented considerably during World War II and especially in the postwar period.

The long war in Vietnam, which traumatized the public and the political community in the 1960s and 1970s, also eroded the system for the separation of powers. In reference to this, American historian A. Schlesinger wrote, with good reason, that "the belief in permanent and pervasive crisis, the fear of communism, and the belief in the United States' duty and right to intervene in any part of the world gave rise to the unprecedented centralization of decisionmaking on matters of war and peace in the president's hands. This was accompanied by the unprecedented alienation of other government agencies, Congress, the press, and public opinion from this decisionmaking. The long war in Vietnam strengthened the tendencies toward centralization and alienation. In this way, the imperial presidency grew at the expense of constitutional principles.... As it absorbed the traditional separation of powers in the foreign policy sphere, it began striving for an equivalent centralization of power in domestic policy."¹⁶ What is more, the concentration of power in the president's hands took place with the tacit consent of the Congress and public opinion, which were so caught up in the crisis line of reasoning that they actively supported "cold war" presidential policies.

Schlesinger had good reason to describe Nixon's presidency as "imperial." Under Nixon the process of the reinforcement of presidential power through the addition of legislative prerogatives was stepped up. After Nixon was re-elected in 1972, he and his advisers launched a reorganization of the federal executive staff in an attempt to form a more private administration, namely by making key departmental positions part of the president's office—i.e., making them supra-departmental and removing them from congressional control and perceptibly limiting Congress' constitutional "power

of the purse"—and by launching a more vigorous purge of the administration, engaging in the unlawful harassment of undesirable career public servants, and trying to establish firm control over the FBI and CIA.¹⁷ Besides this, the Watergate investigation revealed that the president and his subordinates had resorted to systematic violations of the law in the struggle against political opponents.

All of these actions were opposed vehemently by Congress, because, in addition to everything else, they made the legislators too dependent on the will of the White House in the political and personal sense. Some liberal Democratic senators launched a campaign in their states at the beginning of 1973 to mobilize voters against the president in the valid fear that the "imperial presidency" posed a direct threat to democracy. The Senate's investigation of the Watergate scandal became one of the methods of restraining Nixon.

Impeachment proceedings against Nixon were instituted by the Judiciary Committee of the House of Representatives after he fired A. Cox, the special prosecutor conducting an independent investigation of the scandal, in October 1973. This move evoked a literal outburst of indignation in Congress and the nation because it was interpreted, with good reason, as the president's attempt to place himself above the law. Within a few days, thousands of telegrams demanding impeachment had been received in Washington. The mass wave of anti-presidential feeling was also used to pass a law restricting the president's war powers considerably.

At the end of July 1974 the House Judiciary Committee recommended three articles of impeachment against Nixon. The publication of the contents of one of the president's tapes in accordance with a Supreme Court decision evoked a new wave of public indignation. It became clear that the president had constantly lied about his own role in the Watergate affair in his public statements. He would need 34 votes for acquittal, but he could only count on 12-15 votes in the Senate.¹⁸ On 9 August R. Nixon resigned and became the first president in U.S. history to end his political career in this way. A month later the new president, G. Ford, granted him a "full, free and absolute pardon...for all of the crimes he committed or may have committed against the United States" while he was president. Therefore, the impeachment process did not even reach the end of the first stage in Nixon's case.

In the post-Watergate period, Congress took a number of serious legislative measures, in addition to the previously mentioned War Powers Act, to minimize the danger of the creation of autocratic power. These measures limited various presidential prerogatives and strengthened congressional and public oversight of presidential actions.

Of course, any unequivocal conclusions with regard to natural trends in the evolution of the presidency in the United States would require extensive research, possibly

entailing the use of quantitative methods. Only tentative observations can be made in this kind of article. The tendency toward the growth and reinforcement of presidential power in the postwar period is the main issue.

In earlier Soviet studies of American affairs, the ideological tenet of the "general crisis of capitalism" demanded that this tendency be described as a permanent and immutable trend that would lead, sooner or later, to the creation of an authoritarian government. The facts testify that the situation was quite different. Vietnam and Watergate were followed by the perceptible reinforcement of the political role of Congress—i.e., of the legislative branch—in the system for the separation of powers. Whereas the references of presidents of the pre-Vietnam period to the "Soviet threat" and "communist aggression" almost automatically gave them a completely free hand in foreign policy in the atmosphere of fear within the country, this did not happen after Vietnam and Watergate. After taking on the role of "world policeman," the United States overtaxed its strength in Vietnam. This traumatizing experience, compounded by the effects of Watergate and Nixon's "imperial presidency," forced Congress to take measures to prevent such risky "endurance tests" of the whole system in the future.

In my opinion, the creation of an "imperial presidency," not to mention something like an authoritarian regime in the United States, would be politically impossible today. This is attested to by numerous domestic and foreign policy facts. In particular, in the sphere of foreign policy they include the Iran crisis, which quickly put the president back on the legal track; the president's inability, by law, to use military force abroad for more than 2 months without congressional authorization; the effective legislative ban on possible armed intervention against Nicaragua in the 1980s, etc.

Besides this, the perestroika in the USSR, the swift democratic changes and reforms in East European countries, and the end of the cold war have eroded the basis for the fear of communism in the United States, which Schlesinger wrote about, and have thereby eliminated the main foreign policy justification for the creation of an "imperial presidency."

Congress is also playing a much more important role in domestic policy, particularly in planning the federal budget. The most convincing evidence of this might be the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act Congress passed in 1985 on the compulsory reduction of the budget deficit.

It would be wrong, however, to say that the president and the federal administration as a whole are less active in the regulation of socioeconomic processes within the country, even though the conservatives, headed by Ronald Reagan, tried to limit this regulation at the beginning of the 1980s. Reagan did manage to reduce the number of employees in many federal agencies, but the total number of federal employees rose, primarily as a result of staff additions in the Pentagon and Treasury

Department. In 1980 there were around 2.8 million federal employees, but in 1987 the figure exceeded 3 million¹⁹—i.e., it was equivalent to the number in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The cuts in funds for domestic programs were also quite limited.

At this time there seems to be a dynamic balance between the presidency and the Congress, in which one branch is not growing stronger at the expense of the other. Steps in the direction of an "imperial presidency" are checked quickly enough to guarantee the preservation of the democratic political system. By the same token, no serious reduction of the regulating role of the executive branch within the country will be permitted, and this ultimately reflects the views of the majority of voters, who want the federal administration to be responsible for social protection.

Footnotes

1. "The Constitution of the United States of America, Analysis and Interpretation," Washington, 1964, p 45.

2. V.A. Savelyev, "Kapitoliy SSHA: proshloye i nastoyashcheye" [U.S. Capitol: Past and Present], Moscow, 1989, pp 111-113.

3. C. Dunn, "Constitutional Democracy in America," Glenview (Ill.), 1987, p 247.

4. For a more detailed discussion of the relations between political appointees and career public servants and of the merger of the career bureaucracy with the congressional staff and lobbyists, see, for example, S.B. Chetverikov, "Kto i kak delayet politiku SSHA" [U.S. Policymakers and Policymaking], Moscow, 1974, pp 20-49; idem, "Political Appointees and the Washington Bureaucracy," SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, 1987, No 2.

5. "The Constitution....," pp 45-46.

6. For a more detailed discussion, see A.A. Kokoshin, "Conflicts and Disagreements in the Upper Echelons of the Executive Branch," SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, 1983, No 3.

7. After the PRC entered the war in Korea in fall 1950, General D. MacArthur wanted to extend the war to "Mainland China" in the belief that Asia was the main sphere of confrontation between "democracy" and "communism." He was actively supported by the political right wing in the United States in the atmosphere of mounting McCarthyism.

President Truman and his advisers, who were "Atlanticists," insisted on the limited nature of the war because they were more wary of aggression by the Stalin regime in Western Europe.

After MacArthur took several disloyal actions and publicly expressed doubts about the judiciousness of the president's policy, Truman relieved him of his post in April 1951. The incident aroused the anger of the public,

who saw MacArthur as a national hero, and led to acute political conflicts between Congress and the White House. Hearings on the president's Asian policy began in the Senate for the purpose of exerting pressure on him from the right, but the peace talks, which began in Korea in summer 1951 and stabilized the war, gradually made the hearings meaningless. The president's policy proved to be correct.

8. "The Constitution....," p 49.

9. 10 U.S.C. 332.

10. 10 U.S.C. 333.

11. R. Neustadt, "Presidential Power," New York, 1976, p 114. Former Speaker of the House, Democratic Congressman T. O'Neill, for example, had this to say about R. Reagan: "Reagan had a tremendous gift for friendly persuasion.... The president was always phoning members of the House. He did not always get his own way, but the phone calls were never futile. The legislators appreciated them...even when they had no intention of changing their minds to please the president.... After this, they could confidently tell their constituents, 'I was talking to the president a few days ago.' The voters liked this too." "The Reagan Legacy," edited by C. Jones, Chatham (N.Y.), 1988, p 35.

12. D. Stockman, "The Triumph of Politics," New York, 1986, p 394.

13. Of course, the constitutional guarantees against the creation of a dictatorship are far from the only elements of the "checks and balances" of presidential authority. Other such factors are the strong independent parliament, the news media, the Supreme Court, the high general level of political culture in the society, in the presence of which soldiers, in particular, will refuse to carry out unlawful orders, and many others.

14. "The Constitution....," p 46.

15. For a more detailed discussion of the tendency toward the expansion of the federal administration's regulating role, see E.A. Ivanyan, "Belyy dom: prezidenty i politika" [The White House: Presidents and Politics], Moscow, 1979; A.A. Kokoshin, "The Machinery of State," SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, 1980, No 12.

16. A. Schlesinger, "The Imperial Presidency," Boston, 1973, p 208.

17. SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, 1989, No 4, pp 23-32—Ed.

18. B. Goldwater, "With No Apologies," New York, 1979, p 268.

19. "Statistical Abstract of the United States 1989," p 318.

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Simulation of American-Soviet Arms Control Negotiations

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[Article by William Potter, professor and director of Center for Russian and Soviet Studies of International Research Institute in Monterey (California); article written expressly for SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA and translated by V.S. Guseva]

[Text] This article is dedicated to Lawrence Weiler, who taught me arms control simulation, and to the students from whom I also learned a great deal.

The United States and Soviet Union have been negotiating strategic arms reduction for more than 20 years now. Although there has been some progress in arms control (AC), the history of SALT-I, SALT-II, and the talks on strategic arms reduction and space arms is full of mutual misunderstandings, miscalculations, and missed opportunities.

Other, less acclaimed AC talks were going on at the same time. They were distinguished by a much higher level of success and by the age and nationality of the participants. I am referring to the simulations of Soviet-American AC negotiations I have been conducting for 16 years now with students and young researchers from more than 12 countries, including the USSR, Hungary, West Germany, and the United States (the last set of classes took place in Bad Godesberg in the FRG in August 1989).

It is possible that some venerable experts on AC would call the results of simulations unrealistic, but this academic approach warrants increasing attention as the United States and USSR make an effort to find new, non-standard ways of guaranteeing international security. This article, based on the materials of a seminar I conducted in the Soviet Diplomatic Academy in February 1989, is an attempt to present some basic methods of simulating AC negotiations.¹

Why Are Simulation Games (Modeling) Necessary?

Although students like simulation, many instructors have a skeptical view of this teaching method, especially when the entire course is devoted to this kind of exercise. Is it possible, they wonder, for students to excel in a subject as complex as arms control and develop the ability to conduct in-depth analysis without taking copious lecture notes and writing lengthy term papers? Besides this, why should students devote so much time and energy to simulation, sometimes at the expense of other subjects, when there is not even a final exam at the end of the course?

A partial answer might be that "personal participation" and "active learning" are of great value, and so are the motivation and sense of satisfaction the students get from applying concepts and verifying hypotheses in

specific situations. It is one thing, for example, to explain the logic (or absence thereof) of playing "trump cards" in AC negotiations in the abstract, and it is quite another to learn from one's own experience how difficult it can be to get rid of the hundred sea-launched cruise missiles on assault submarines that represent the main obstacle to a strategic arms limitation agreement. In short, simulation gives students a better understanding of the relationship between theory and practice.

The role of personal participation is particularly important in higher academic institutions, where classes are usually large and where students have little opportunity to interact with instructors and with each other. Simulation seminars lasting a week or a whole semester are conducted in small groups, where all of the participants can get to know each other and learn from each other. These classes are often the only chance students have to demonstrate and develop their oratorical skills. For many who are languishing in the atmosphere of passive learning, the discovery of their own genuine oratorical talents and potential for interpersonal communication comes as a big surprise. It is quite probable that they will become brilliant students. Besides this, the simulation of American-Soviet AC negotiations gives the student a sense of personal involvement and develops his ability to put himself in another participant's place and see the world, even if only for a short time, through his eyes. This "seeing through the eyes of others" can produce remarkable results, especially if representatives of different countries participate in the simulation game, including people accustomed to seeing each other as adversaries. By performing these roles, the students soon realize the great differences between the customs of different countries and the views of their agencies or establishments.

One West German student who participated in simulated negotiations came up with what I regard as the best description of the potential of instruction through the simulation of practice: "You learn that arms control is not simply a matter of 'bean-counting,' or a 50-percent reduction, or a handshake.... You learn that AC represents a complex in which national history, views of security, perceptions of the opponent, strategy, technology, and diplomacy interact. You realize that success takes more than goodwill on both sides; success is not necessarily the same thing as the conclusion of an agreement, and sometimes 'less' means 'more.' After seeing how the issue of arms control is oversimplified in the newspapers and in academic literature, the simulation of negotiations in Los Angeles can be regarded primarily as a process of separating myth from reality. In short, this is the best university course imaginable."²

Basic Principles of Simulation

Just as all other types of modeling, the simulation of American-Soviet AC negotiations requires some oversimplification of the real state of affairs. It is undesirable, and even impossible, to include all of the factors the participants in AC negotiations actually encounter. The most difficult

thing is the calculation of domestic political pressure in one's own country and the pressure exerted by allies. The fact that the scenarios are taken from "natural time," however, makes the simulations more realistic. In other words, the point of departure consists of American-Soviet nuclear parity and the interrelations of the sides in their present form. As military, political, and economic conditions change in the real world, the scenarios also have to be modified and updated.

Each instructor can choose to vary the simulation exercises to fit his own requirements and academic goals. The majority of instructors divide classes into two groups of 10 or 15 students, one of which will represent the Soviet delegation at AC negotiations while the other represents the American delegation. This division reflects the essentially bilateral nature of the talks on strategic arms and nuclear and space arms.³

An understanding of the intense domestic political bargaining between various government agencies involved in the AC process requires that each student in the two groups represent one of these agencies or perform other specific functions. The actual distribution of roles will depend on the size of the class, of course, but it is best to represent the functional and organizational interests of the following agencies as fully as possible.

U.S. Delegation	USSR Delegation
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency	Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Disarmament and Arms Reduction Administration)
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)	Armed Forces General Staff
Congress	Ministry of Finance
U.S. Air Force (Joint Chiefs of Staff)	National Air Defense Forces
National Security Council (NSC)	Soviet Intelligence (KGB)
Office of Secretary of Defense (civilian)	Navy
Adviser on science and technology	President's personal advisers
State Department (European Division)	Supreme Soviet (Committee on International Affairs)
State Department (USSR Division)	USSR representative in International Trade Organization
Office of Management and Budget	Strategic missile forces
U.S. Navy (JCS)	Adviser on technology (USSR Academy of Sciences)
	Ministry of Foreign Affairs (U.S. Department)

One or a few students in the seminar can choose the role of newspaper reporter, compiling and distributing reports on the progress of the talks or writing articles on problems in negotiations. These materials can be published in the student newspaper.

The first thing each "team" should do is elect a delegation head, deputy, and secretary. The instructor might

want to make these appointments himself, but in most cases it is better for the teams to make these choices. Furthermore, in most cases, few of the students, if any, have the necessary experience. For this reason, it is sometimes useful for the election of the permanent leader to be postponed for a few classes while several candidates take turns playing the role of delegation head.

After the organizational matters have been settled but before the beginning of the negotiations, both teams should prepare a package of documents on the main topics of discussion. These documents, presumably written for the chiefs of state, will simultaneously serve to introduce the students to the interests of the agencies they represent and will serve as auxiliary material for the compilation of delegation statements for the plenary meeting on the first day of negotiations. Although it is possible that one agency might be more interested in a particular document than another, several students can choose the same topic, but it must be examined from both sides. For example, the representatives of the CIA and Congress might be most interested in the United States' verification possibilities. In exactly the same way, representatives of the Ministry of Finance and General Staff (USSR) might choose to discuss domestic economic or departmental incentives or, on the contrary, obstacles to a new AC agreement.

All delegation members must receive these documents, which do not have to be long (four or five typewritten pages). After the delegations have discussed the materials, they should begin working on the delegations' statements for the first plenary session. Each delegation should also try to define its goals and discuss negotiating tactics.

Here is an approximate list of the matters on which each team should prepare reports.

1. Your opponent's current strategic potential.
2. Your own strategic potential.
3. Your opponent's existing and projected strategic programs and their implications for the security of your side and your strategic programs.
4. Your general strategic goals at the talks (maximum and minimum).
5. Your opponent's general strategic goals at the talks (maximum and minimum).
6. Specific options for the limitation of strategic forces and space weapons.
7. Verification requirements and possibilities for agreement on arms control with alternative options.
8. National agency (for example, congressional) or economic incentives for, and obstacles to, new arms control agreements.

Some political documents are simpler and are easier to compile (for example, 1 and 2) than others. Topics 4 and 6 are particularly important, and the students should pay closer attention to them, although few will be expected to actually compile reports on them.

Before the statements for the beginning of negotiations, based on the discussion of all of these political documents, have been compiled, each team should prepare the set of instructions with which the national government should supply its delegation in Geneva for advancement toward agreed goals. This is an important document, which must be borne in mind constantly as the negotiations progress. Although this requirement might seem completely obvious, in the heat of negotiations, when emotions flare up, there is a tendency to forget the original concerns that brought the two sides to the negotiating table.

The simulation of negotiations must meet five basic conditions. The necessary informational materials must be discussed thoroughly within the delegations. Debates within the team should be conducted throughout the simulation. Besides this, the students participating in the negotiations must meet periodically at formal plenary sessions with all members of both delegations present. The first plenary session will be a forum for the presentation of the official statements of each side. They can be brief and general or long and detailed, depending on the delegation's goals and choice of negotiating tactics. In any case, the statement should be typed and distributed to the members of the other delegation.

There is no set number of plenary sessions. The two delegations will generally meet each time new official proposals are submitted. The plenary sessions are usually conducted in the appropriate, businesslike manner with the heads of the two delegations alternating as chairman. The sense of reality can be heightened if the students are dressed for the occasion and if the statements of the sides are read in the appropriate languages.

Because the plenary sessions are official and are attended by many people, and because the subject of negotiations is extremely complex, after an agreement has been reached on the specific topics, it is advisable to form less official and smaller working groups in each delegation. The groups can be responsible for one particular topic—for example, strategic arms, space weapons, the limitation of test flights, or questions of verification. A delegation might feel the need to create a working group to investigate a matter unrelated to the topics of the groups created earlier. Each student participating in the simulation should be a member of at least one of these groups. The delegation head should keep all members of the delegation informed of all developments and coordinate the team's general policy line.

To underscore the important role domestic political factors often play in AC negotiations and to institute a "controlling mechanism" or a point of reference, the instructor should arrange for a simulation of a Supreme

Soviet session or a meeting of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. These meetings should be conducted separately with each delegation for 1 or 2 hours. There the students will have an opportunity to demonstrate their understanding of the subject. For the instructor, this is one chance to assess the positions of the whole delegation and of each separate member. The roles of members of the Supreme Soviet or Senate Foreign Relations Committee⁴ can be played by all of the representatives of the given academic institution (including instructors, graduate students, and others) with the appropriate knowledge of USSR and U.S. foreign and military policy.

After the students have reported on the state of affairs at the negotiations, the members of the national political bodies can ask the head of the delegation or the representatives of various agencies questions. The questions are frequently useful in the sense that they focus attention on the broader political issues the students sometimes overlook because they are preoccupied with the technical aspects of weapons systems and means of verification. Another goal is the motivation of students to learn about the aspects of delegation proposals that might not have been analyzed sufficiently in their working groups.

The students usually find it extremely helpful to conduct hearings of this kind at the beginning of the simulation (after the working groups have been formed, for example), and another set of hearings when the negotiations have progressed significantly or, ideally, after the treaty has been signed. The instructor should take care not to schedule these domestic political hearings just before the conclusion of the agreement, especially if there is not much time left until the end of the semester (or any other scheduled date for the end of the simulation). This could derail all earlier efforts because it is possible that the outside experts might come up with insurmountable obstacles at the last minute. If possible, the hearings should be videotaped, so that the members of both delegations can use the tapes as reference material during the discussion following the negotiations. If there is enough time, it is also quite useful to hold practice hearings by organizing some kind of rehearsal to calm the students' nerves and reveal the kind of questions they might be asked.

In addition to the more formal classroom communication, contact outside the classroom is also possible. These unofficial conversations between the members of a single team and with representatives of different delegations often provide an opportunity to express one's own ideas, hear the reactions of others to them, and learn their opinions and preferences. This is particularly important in an atmosphere of pervasive tension. In this case, the instructor should probably encourage informal contact, perhaps by inviting the participants to a social gathering in his own home.

Foreseeing Problems

Several problems can arise during the simulation process. Some are connected with the subject itself and others are connected with the teaching method.

Supervision and guidance. The first and foremost job of each delegation consists in elaborating a general negotiating strategy, covering all goals, and the necessary tactics. In view of the fact that each delegation member will have his own point of view as well as the outlook and opinions of the agency he represents, arguments within the delegation could arouse hostility and even test the unity of the team. Disagreements between delegation members could also break out during the negotiations as participants respond to the demands and proposals of the other side. If the students are left to their own devices, these disagreements could give rise to personal enmity and even break up the negotiating team.

It must be said that these difficulties also complicate the work of real delegations at real talks. As Raymond Garthoff, former State Department official and the senior adviser at the SALT-I negotiations, remarked, "the American delegation's biggest problem in the SALT-I negotiations (consisted) in the lack of agreement on our own goals. There was the conviction that our job consisted in arguing with the Russians and making more and more new demands on them. For this reason, the heaviest burden was the endless coordination and constant maneuvering of different groups within the American administration." He went on to say that "if one side cannot agree on the goals of negotiation and if these goals are not clear, and if the bureaucratic struggle over them continues, there is a tendency to concentrate more on 'internal' negotiations than on negotiations with the other side."⁵

The history of the SALT-II, strategic arms reduction, and intermediate-range weapons negotiations, and of the ongoing talks on nuclear and space arms, proves that Garthoff's observations are still relevant.⁶ The Soviet side's observations have been more general. It is quite possible, however, that the Soviet side's position in negotiations also reflects intense intra-political debates between representatives of agencies pursuing different goals within the country and in the international arena.⁷

Interpersonal relations. Participants in negotiations have a difficult, and sometimes simply depressing, job. For this reason, there are cases when emotions can cloud their point of view. They must not allow their emotions to prevail. As the same Garthoff stressed, "patience and firmness are necessary virtues in the negotiating process, but this is not true of counterproductive, unreasonable, or excessive obstinacy. Controlled flexibility is essential.... In short, it is necessary to see the difference between patience and stubbornness, firmness and flexibility, and know when and how to use each of these qualities."⁸

Because of the complex nature of the subject matter of negotiations, the strict time limit, and the intensive

nature of the simulated negotiations, personal misunderstandings and misinterpretations of intentions and views are inevitable. All of this can cause a great deal of friction within the delegations and between them. For this reason, it is extremely important that the head of the delegation be experienced in interpersonal communication. Quite frequently, the most effective work is done not by the delegations consisting of the most brilliant students, but by the ones most capable of functioning as a cohesive team.

The amount of work the students are required to do is substantial and usually exceeds their original expectations. The constant analysis of information, the discussions within delegations and working groups, the talks between delegations, the reports presented orally and the papers to be written all require time and effort. The most amazing thing is probably that the student does most of his work not at the instructor's request, but on his own initiative. This, however, is one of the chief merits of the simulation method. The participants in the game quickly realize that the more time they spend preparing for negotiations, the more productive their efforts will be. Besides this, it does not take them long to realize that they can learn a great deal from each other. This is precisely why they will not be inclined to put up with team members who do not contribute enough to the team effort.

In other words, students should not regard the simulation as only a game. It is a serious and intensive course of study. It makes great demands on the student, but it also gives him a great deal of satisfaction.

The instructor is unlikely to have difficulty motivating the students. Difficulties are more likely to arise in the organization of simulation classes in such a way as to leave the students enough time for their work in other subjects. The instructor should inform future participants in simulations in advance that they will take a great deal of time. He should have a talk with each one to explain the nature of this method. Although successful participation in simulation is possible without preliminary special classes in arms control or the fundamentals of USSR and U.S. foreign policy, it will nevertheless require the student to have some knowledge of the basic facts of the AC negotiations of the "superpowers" and the fundamentals of their policy in this sphere. At the very least, the students should read periodicals dealing with foreign policy, military issues, and arms control.

How close is simulation to reality? The use of scenarios of real AC negotiations, the introduction of the interests of competing agencies into this process, and the organization of hearings before the political bodies of each side all contribute to the approximation of a real situation. Conversations with the professionals who took part in real AC negotiations and who occasionally come to the United States (or the country where the simulation is conducted), the organization of unofficial meetings and other gatherings for students participating in the simulation, the use of Russian-language publications and the

Russian language itself for oral reports in class, and the analysis of the latest political information and data on negotiating techniques also heighten the realism of the simulation and the enthusiasm of the students.

In fact, the instructor will be amazed at how quickly the students assume the roles of delegation members and representatives of different agencies. An extremely capable American student who was part of the Soviet delegation in a simulation of AC negotiations provides an indicative example. After she had completed her studies and had earned her degree, she was offered a job in the U.S. intelligence community. At first, she kept getting confused, using the term "we" to refer to the Soviet side and "they" in reference to the Americans.

Most of the measures intended to heighten the realism of simulation are also desirable from the academic standpoint. The attempts of students to imitate the behavior of real world political figures, however, might have to be restrained and adjusted at times in the interest of investigating new ideas in the sphere of AC. Although students have to consider the interests of the agencies they represent, for example, they should be encouraged to think for themselves, so that they will appreciate (but not necessarily accept) approaches which might not occur to the real agencies bound by bureaucratic procedure.

In exactly the same way, the students participating in simulations should take the internal economic and political factors of the countries they represent into account. These factors can interfere with the acceptance of innovative AC proposals. In these cases, the students should not simply copy the actions of their real counterparts. They should be told that they are free to act as they wish and do not have to be biased, but can be open to new ideas if they are prepared to defend their point of view to the political bodies of the countries they represent.

The dramatic changes in USSR and U.S. positions on AC after 1986 attest to the pernicious effects outdated ideas had on political thinking in the past. If the students who participated in the simulation negotiations at the University of California in Los Angeles in 1986 had dared to submit proposals at national political hearings similar to the ones discussed at the real summit meeting in Reykjavik in October that same year, the experts who had been invited to represent the Politburo and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee would have simply ridiculed them.

Here is another warning about the efforts to approximate reality. In our day, when diplomats often display contempt or disrespect for the law, it is not surprising that students can also be tempted to use any methods, sometimes unscrupulous or even illegal, to get information from the other side. To prevent this kind of behavior, I would recommend that the instructor begin the classes with a categorical denunciation of the illegal gathering of information.

Interrupt or keep quiet? One of the most difficult things for the instructor will be the stifling of his own urges to

interrupt internal political hearings or the talks between delegations in order to correct a false statement, suggest a solution, or help the participants in some other way. There might be rare cases in which intervention is necessary (to cool down emotions, for example), but in general the instructor will have to hold his tongue. This advice might sound simple, but it is extremely difficult to follow. It is based on experience, however, acquired during the process of more than 10 years of using this method, which proved that the instructor is most effective as the director (or organizer) of the simulation process, and not as an active participant. He must spend a great deal of time consulting with the students outside the classroom, recommending sources of information and discussing, when he is asked, the strong and weak points of the proposals that are being drawn up. It is particularly important for the instructor to remain impartial in consultations with both sides. It will take a great deal of effort on his part to assure both delegations that the materials prepared by them (political documents, draft memoranda, plenary session statements, etc.) and marked "confidential" will remain confidential. The students will inevitably become literally obsessed with the need to prevent information leaks, and the instructor is often viewed as a possible culprit. Besides this, the instructor should make an effort to devote equal time to the two delegations. Ideally, his assistant should be with one delegation while he is keeping an eye on the other.

Performance evaluations. There is an obvious selection process by which the unorthodox nature of simulation and its specific requirements appeal to the most capable students, the over-achievers. For the reasons mentioned above, most students will do a great deal of work even though no term papers or exams will be required. Nevertheless, at some point many students might be disturbed by the absence of performance evaluations, especially when they realize how much time they have spent on the simulation in comparison with their work in other subjects. Because of the small size of the classes and the very nature of the course, demanding frequent and active participation by the students, the instructor will have many opportunities to evaluate the performance of each.

The reports they present, their oral statements, and their answers to questions in internal political hearings will also give him an opportunity to grade them. Besides this, the instructor could even arrange for a final examination, in which the students could, for example, assess the concluded treaty (or treaties) from the standpoint of the theory of deterrence, the original goals of the delegations, and the interests of the agencies they represent. If a treaty has not been concluded, the final exam could focus on the internal and external factors impeding successful negotiations. The prospect of an examination is sometimes necessary, because it makes the simulation process more authentic. After all, participants in real negotiations are also bound by certain dates or events—for example, elections or political crises.

Whether a final exam is scheduled or not, it is useful to hold one class in which the students are asked to evaluate each other's contributions (excellent, average, or minimal) and the contribution of those with whom they maintained personal contact during the simulation process. These evaluations will be essentially identical to the ones mentioned above, but they will provide an opportunity to consider all aspects of performance, including the extracurricular work the instructor might not know about.

Duration of simulation game. Whatever the duration of the simulation—a few days, weeks, or months—students always complain that they do not have enough time. A simulation of any length, however, can be quite productive. Everything depends on the goals of instruction—the study of the opponent's ideas, bureaucratic political procedures, and the very process of negotiating and drafting treaties.

One way of speeding up the negotiations and avoiding endless arguments about the credibility of information consists in the provision of both teams with an "agreed information base" on the weapons in use at the very beginning of the process. It is true that this gives the students less opportunity to discern the tendentiousness of various sources of information. By the same token, they cannot fully appreciate the real problems negotiators face when they have to choose the specific objects of negotiation.

If time allows, one or more classes should be devoted to the drafting of a treaty and the compilation of a glossary of AC terms. This is often extremely difficult, and many members of the delegations will be shocked when they learn how their basic concept of the agreement differs from the actual language of the treaty.

It is also desirable to leave some time for an analysis of the simulation. This excuse to criticize basic negotiating tactics, misunderstandings, and lessons can be amusing as well as instructive. Excerpts from the internal hearings where the fine points of the delegation's goals and tactics were decided, should be examined in the presence of both delegations. It is often surprising how frequently the students, even if they are all from the same country, misinterpret each other's intentions when they are artificially placed in an adversary relationship: As a rule, they ascribe the worst of all possible motives to the other side. The discussion of these episodes and other incidents giving rise to difficulties can shed light on the problems American and Soviet negotiators encounter in Geneva and on the possibilities for their resolution.

Conclusion

The simulation of American-Soviet AC negotiations might be an unexpected experience for the instructor and the students. Professors who regard simulation as an easier method than painstaking preparations for lectures will be greatly disillusioned. Because simulated negotiations are frequently continued outside the classroom, consultations with students also transcend this boundary. In fact, they might be in contact almost around the clock. It is not extraordinary for the

instructor to receive a telephone call at home at night with a request for immediate intervention because the agreement might be aborted at the last minute. It is possible that the instructor will feel the greatest pressure after the course has ended, when he receives a flood of requests for letters of recommendation. This is a natural result of this form of instruction, which requires a student to exert himself to the utmost and encourages interaction between the student and the instructor.

Even though simulation means a great deal of work, it also provides a great deal of satisfaction. Sometimes it is difficult to restrain the infectious enthusiasm of students who do not want the course to come to an end. The most interesting thing is to see how creative theory is employed in practice and how sometimes, but not always, original and realistic approaches to real international problems are born.

Footnotes

1. Also see W. Potter, "A Guide to Simulating U.S.-Soviet Arms Control Negotiations," CISA Working Paper No 62, UCLA, April 1988.

2. M. Ruhle, "Negotiations in Los Angeles: Some Personal Reflections," December 1986, p 9.

3. Although these data focus on American-Soviet nuclear arms negotiations, this form of simulation is equally applicable to the study of talks on conventional arms reduction, nuclear test and chemical weapon bans, and nuclear nonproliferation.

4. For some reason the author constantly equates the USSR Supreme Soviet with the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, although it is obvious that they are not equivalent; the latter is only a congressional body. It would probably be more accurate for him to use the appropriate committee of the USSR Supreme Soviet in the comparison or to compare the Supreme Soviet to the Congress—Ed.

5. R. Garthoff, "Negotiating with the Russians: Some Lessons from SALT," *INTERNATIONAL SECURITY*, Spring 1977, p 19.

6. See, for example, S. Talbott, "Endgame: The Inside Story of SALT II," New York, 1979; idem, "Deadly Gambits," New York, 1984; "A Game for High Stakes. Lessons Learned in Negotiating with the Soviet Union," edited by L. Sloss and M. Scott Davis, Cambridge (Mass.), 1986.

7. V. Israelyan, "On Diplomatic Negotiations," *INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS*, January 1989, pp 75-88; T. Wolfe, "The SALT Experience," Cambridge (Mass.), 1979; D. Holloway, "The Soviet Union and the Arms Race," New Haven, 1983; J. Valenta and W. Potter, "Soviet Decisionmaking for National Security," Boston, 1984; M. MacGwire, "Military Objectives in Soviet Foreign Policy," Washington, 1987.

8. R. Garthoff, *Op. cit.*, p 24

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Soviet-U.S. Naval Balance Viewed

AU1012060090 Moscow SSHA EKONOMIKA,
POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No. 9 Sep 90
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[Article by Igor Fedorovich Bocharov, captain 1st rank in reserve, candidate of technical sciences, senior scientific associate and consultant at the United States of America and Canada Institute: "What Will the Admirals Say?"]

[Text] Following the speech made by USSR President M.S. Gorbachev at the third session of the USSR Supreme Soviet on 12 June 1990 which dealt with the results of his state visit to Canada and the United States, one of the questions raised concerned the rejection by the United States in March 1990 of Soviet proposals to begin negotiations on the reduction of naval forces. In his brief and fairly informal reply, M.S. Gorbachev emphasized that the naval forces in the United States are "as it were a protected zone" and, at the same time, "a very important component of general policy" on account of the specific nature of its geostrategic situation which has been historically conditioned by the tradition of extensive naval ties with all regions of the globe. He also expressed the following opinion: "Nevertheless, I believe that the matter and the process are developing in such a way that we will come to these types of armaments too in subsequent stages... we will come to this favorite baby of the U.S. Administration."

Indeed, the process of arms control and disarmament is proceeding in such a way that, today, the naval forces represent a component which is being weakly controlled within the framework of international agreements. As ground forces and combat aviation are being reduced, there is a corresponding increase in the contribution of naval forces to the balance of forces. As a result of this we can see an increase in both their purely military significance and in the influence which they can and will exert on stability in the world and on the development of the military-political situation in the event of the outbreak of any conflicts. We have, by now, concluded treaties limiting and reducing other types of armed forces and weapons almost to an extent beyond which naval forces are becoming a brake on this process. One significant example is sufficient to illustrate this point: the difficulties in negotiations on a 50-percent reduction of strategic offensive weapons because of American long-range sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCM).

In connection with this, I would like to express my very personal opinion on the prospects of the "parents" being able to agree on instilling a more peace-loving character in their "favorite baby." Why only in him? Both the readiness of the USSR to quickly start negotiations on the limitation and reduction of naval weapons and naval activity and the more than one and a half dozen proposals—in package form and individual—for reducing this type of weaponry and

limiting operations by the USSR Navy and U.S. naval forces on a global and regional level are quite well-known to the world public and to the U.S. military-political leadership. The Soviet Union has also taken unilateral steps to reduce the effective combat strength of the Navy and limit its activities in the open ocean.

It is obvious that all these steps are aimed at initiating the start of negotiations between the USSR and the United States on naval problems. However, what is the other side doing?

Even while M.S. Gorbachev was still delivering his speech at the third session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, we could have spoken about the absence of any reciprocal steps on the part of the United States. However, we live in a rapidly changing world. As early as 19 June 1990, the U.S. Secretary of Defense R. Cheney submitted to Congress a plan involving a 25-percent reduction of the country's Armed Forces over the next five years; in particular, this plan envisages a reduction in the number of fighting ships from 566 to 455, that is to say a reduction of 111 units or almost 20 percent, and a reduction in the number of aircraft carriers from 14 to 12 which will lead to a corresponding cut in carrier aviation.

It is interesting to note the report of the Washington correspondent of THE NEW YORK TIMES regarding the reaction of congressional leaders to the Cheney plan: "This process will result in a 10-percent reduction of the military budget. Congressional leaders have called for more radical reductions. However, some of them have welcomed the Cheney plan as signaling the emergence of consensus between the Bush administration and experts in Congress on the question of the future of the country's Armed Forces." Of course, this is still a plan but, judging from the mood of congressional leaders, it will obviously become a reality.

Yet, how can one then correlate this plan with the points relating to U.S. naval forces contained in the report "U.S. Strategy in the Sphere of National Security" which was submitted to Congress by President Bush on 20 March 1990? It is stated in the report: "The Soviet Union has called upon us to start negotiations on the objectives [obyekty] of our naval forces. We have rejected these proposals as they contradict the fundamental realities of the interests of the free world.... Their Navy serves the purpose of coastal defense or of depriving us of the possibility of protecting our vital interests. There is no symmetry here. Our naval strength also cannot be compared with Soviet superiority in ground forces, a superiority which it is our intention to reduce as it creates the threat of attack by virtue of its nature, size, and components. There is not a single navy which can pose such a threat to the Soviet Union."

In analyzing the objective nature of the different factors which underlie the formulation of such a strategy in the

sphere of naval forces, it is necessary to assess the existing characteristics and degree of dynamics of these factors depending upon the level of military-political relations between the USSR and the United States and the most likely prospects for their development.

The description of the USSR Navy given in the American President's report as serving "the purposes of coastal defense" is objectively confirmed by the strength level of its fleet forces. As Marshall of the Soviet Union S.F. Akhromeyev stated in September 1988, only 12 percent of our Navy is made up of warships operating in the ocean zone (in the U.S. naval forces these warships total 65 percent). The geostrategic situation of the USSR—it does not have free exit into the open ocean—has a considerable influence upon the operational deployment of the Soviet Navy.

As is well known, the United States and its allies have created in the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans powerful strategic antisubmarine barriers in the form of fixed-site hydroacoustic underwater surveillance networks (SOSUS) which are capable not only of indicating the type of submarine detected but also of identifying a specific submarine according to its "hydroacoustic certificate."

It is obvious that, on account of these circumstances, the USSR Navy cannot pose too great a threat to the sea lines of communication of the United States and its allies.

The defensive orientation of the Soviet Navy is fairly static due to the new political situation in the USSR; the new conditions make it impossible, for objective reasons, to allocate considerable material resources in order to change this orientation. There can be no surprises here for the United States. It is true that it seems somewhat contradictory to see such large aircraft carriers as the "Tbilisi" enter naval service. However, this can obviously be explained, first and foremost, by the fact that those decisions adopted during the notorious times of the "cold war" to create an ocean navy at any cost are still not moribund. This question is now being widely discussed at different levels and a suitable resolution will probably be found.

The problem of long-range SLCM's gives more cause for concern. According to statistics published in the Western press, along with the deployment of SLCM's such as the "Tomahawk," even more long-range supersonic cruise missiles based on "stealth" technology are being elaborated in the United States.

At the same time, as the Secretary of Defense R. Cheney noted in his annual report (1990) to the President and to Congress, in the USSR too "they are continuing to develop long-range SLCM's, including the SS-N-21, which is similar to the "Tomahawk" missile, and the SS-NX-24."

It is obvious that the appearance of such symptoms revealing the possibility of a spiral in the arms race with

regard to long-range naval nuclear weapons designed to deliver a strike deep into the territories of opposing states is the result of a lack of agreement on the part of the United States to include naval forces in the negotiating processes.

Yet, there is numerous evidence of the fact that the elimination of nuclear SLCM's would also correspond to the interests of U.S. national security. Let us take as an example the statement made by Mitchell Ross, an expert in these affairs, which was published in FOREIGN POLICY, No. 77: "The prohibition of long-range nuclear SLCM's may be more advantageous to the United States than to the USSR. Short-range nuclear cruise missiles make up the main striking force of the USSR Navy. Their removal would help to ensure the survival of U.S. naval forces in conditions of a nuclear confrontation. Although, at present, the United States has a technological lead over the USSR as far as long-range SLCM's are concerned, when the USSR catches up this could prove alarming to the United States which has a higher concentration of its population and industry located close to its coastline, a fact which makes it more vulnerable to SLCM attacks. The advantages of prohibiting SLCM's were clearly delineated in January 1989 at a meeting of the Discussion Group on Strategic Policy which includes senators Sam Nunn (a Democrat from the state of Georgia) and John Warner (a Republican from the state of Virginia) from the Armed Services Senate Committee and a member of the House of Representatives Les Aspin (a Democrat from the state of Wisconsin) from the House of Representatives Armed Services Committee."

Similar statements were made recently by Admiral W. Crowe, the former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and by Admiral C. Trost, the chief of Naval Operations

Recently, the U.S. Administration has also begun to take certain steps aimed at limiting naval nuclear weapons. As M.S. Gorbachev stated in his already mentioned speech at the session of the USSR Supreme Soviet on 12 June 1990, during the course of his meeting with President Bush agreement was reached on the question of SLCM's: This question would not be raised within the framework of the future treaty on a 50-percent reduction of strategic offensive weapons. "They are confined to a separate document which will be an annex to the treaty. This is how we raised the question from the very beginning.... In addition to 6,000 warheads [boyezaryady], the USSR and the United States each have the right to deploy 880 such missiles on submarines and specific types of surface ships. That is to say, a level has been established and fixed, something which we had not succeeded in achieving throughout the whole course of the negotiations. This has now been done."

However, it should be pointed out that this figure (880 missiles) exceeds somewhat the number of American nuclear SLCM's planned earlier for deployment, a number which, according to numerous open sources,

amounts to approximately 760 units of which about 370 have already been deployed.

It is obvious that, although the aforementioned "Strategy" was only presented to Congress in March 1990, some of its points, for example that American naval power "cannot be compared with Soviet superiority in ground forces" and that "not a single navy can present such a threat to the Soviet Union," already by the middle of the current year, did not correspond to reality.

Furthermore, the situation could change even more radically by the end of 1990. The Vienna negotiations are proceeding successfully following a resolution of the question regarding armored equipment, and it is certain that an agreement on the reduction of armed forces and conventional weapons in Europe will be signed at the end of 1990. As a result, the Soviet Union will no longer have any superiority in ground forces which would have presented "a threat of attack." However, if we also take into consideration the state of affairs in the Warsaw Pact, it becomes absolutely obvious that U.S. naval forces—without taking account of the naval strategic nuclear component (nuclear submarines equipped with ballistic missiles)—are beginning to represent a real and direct threat to the territory of the Soviet Union.

Insofar as launch platforms for SLCM's are mobile while submarines equipped with them can, in addition, remain undetected to a large degree and are able to cruise in the Arctic seas contiguous to the USSR coastline, Soviet territory is vulnerable to attack from them from the north, north-west, south-west, south-east, east, and north-east, that is to say from all directions except from the south. At the same time, one should also bear in mind the operational threat to Soviet territory from nuclear-armed carrier-based aircraft of the U.S. naval forces. They have superiority in the accommodations of their amphibious warfare ships by a factor of almost four.

Certain coastal regions of the USSR are also under threat from the strike capability of almost 1,000 deployed SLCM's equipped with single or multiple [kassetniy] conventional warheads specially intended for inflicting particularly accurate strikes against individual ground targets at a distance of up to 1,300 kilometers and also from the strike capability of carrier aircraft using conventional weapons.

In accordance with the Watkins-Leman nonnuclear naval strategy which exists *de facto* in the United States, the aim of U.S. naval forces is to destroy Soviet nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines [SSBN] in Soviet coastal waters using conventional antisubmarine weapons.

In connection with this, it should be pointed out that the possibility of defeating strategic sea-based nuclear forces using conventional weapons and also the presence of long-range SLCM's equipped with nuclear and conventional warheads on the same delivery platforms will increase the risk of accidentally triggering off a nuclear

war unless a set of rules governing the actions taken by the sides in such situations is elaborated in the course of the negotiations. For corresponding types of conventional naval weapons, we could, at the negotiations, also establish, for example, standard rules for compulsory technical devices which will reliably prevent both their unsanctioned launch and their elimination in flight.

Indeed, it cannot be excluded that, from the organizational, technical, and moral points of view, control over the employment of conventional antisubmarine weapons could be far less strict than that over the employment of nuclear weapons. Therefore, one cannot completely rule out the risk of a chance attack against SSBN's using conventional antisubmarine weapons. If this were to occur without agreement having been reached beforehand on the rules of action for such a situation, one side could, in principle, view the incident as an action taken by the opposing side which is aimed at preparing for or starting a nuclear war. At best, this would lead to an escalation of the conflict which would have an unpredictable and irrational outcome.

An analogous situation could also arise if a SLCM equipped with conventional warheads is accidentally launched, something which could happen as such launches are less easy to monitor. In view of the fact that such a SLCM could be equipped with nuclear warheads, the other side, having decided that this is the case, could resort to adopting an extreme decision, something which again does not exclude an irrational outcome of the incident.

Hence, as the number of nuclear strategic offensive weapons, ground forces, and conventional weapons are reduced, there will be an abnormal increase in the strike and operational and strategic capability of the U.S. naval forces. Therefore, it is absolutely obvious that, in the general context of limiting other types of military activity, a imbalance in naval activity is, to an ever increasing degree, acting as a brake on the negotiating processes between the East and the West regarding further limitations and reductions of nuclear and conventional weapons.

This objective reality ought to stimulate the U.S. Administration into realizing the necessity of starting negotiations on limiting and reducing the naval activity of the USSR and the United States. Many representatives of political, scientific, and military circles in the United States have long understood the urgency of such a step.

The main, if one can put it like this, political and technical problem preventing the start of negotiations on the limitation and reduction of, first and foremost, nuclear naval weapons, as seen by U.S. officials, is the impossibility of implementing reliable control over such limitations and reductions.

As regards this question, it is useful to cite part of an article published in *THE NEW YORK TIMES* in June 1990 concerning the signing of the agreement between the USSR and the United States during the Washing on

summit on an 80-percent reduction of chemical weapons: "... what is most remarkable is that an agreement was reached in spite of the fact that it will be difficult to verify that its conditions are being observed. This shows that the two old rivals have now reached a certain degree of mutual trust. This also serves as an example of what the superpowers are capable of doing in order to satisfy their real needs in the sphere of security in the process of switching from deterrence to cooperation." To this opinion, we have to add that, up to now, there has been no specific discussion at any official level between the USSR and the United States of the questions of control over the limitation and reduction of nuclear naval weapons and there has been no joint research by governmental experts.

Such a step taken by the U.S. Administration as the plan submitted to Congress proposing a 25-percent reduction of the Armed Forces, including significant cuts in the combat strength level of the naval forces, shows that, at present, both the USSR and the United States are implementing or planning the reduction of their naval forces by taking unilateral steps. Unilateral measures are undoubtedly important but, naturally, they are based on unilateral expediency (for example, the removal from operational status of obsolete models of weaponry, budgetary limitations, the transfer to new and more efficient concepts of using the Armed Forces, and so forth) and do not take into consideration the military-political interests of the other side. These factors explain why such measures are essentially less effective with regard to reducing the level of military confrontation and increasing confidence. Therefore, they cannot replace, in particular, those agreements on the limitation and reduction of naval forces which have been elaborated in the course of the negotiations and which have been legally ratified.

At the same time, one may assume that the steps being planned for a reduction of U.S. naval forces bear witness to the fact that the military-political leadership in Washington is taking real account of the significant relaxation in the military-political situation and these steps may also signal the start of a trend indicating movement toward negotiations on naval forces.

On the part of the Soviet Union, an important step which would further facilitate the creation of a favorable atmosphere for the start of negotiations on naval problems would be to give more concrete information regarding questions relating to the USSR Navy, including plans for its further development. Obviously, this can only be achieved following a detailed professional and critical examination of such questions by the USSR Supreme Soviet and its appropriate committees and commissions.

We also cannot ignore the increased role of the Soviet public in the international movement for the start of negotiations, first and foremost, between the USSR and the United States, on reducing military confrontation on the seas and oceans.

On the initiative of the commission "Peace to the Oceans," which is attached to the Soviet Committee for the Defense of Peace, the first international seminar dealing with questions of limiting the naval arms race was held in Moscow in February 1990; it was attended by former political figures, scientists, and both retired military personnel and those still in active service from the USSR, the United States, Canada, and the countries of East and West Europe, Asia, and Latin America. The participants in the seminar were unanimous in their view that dialogue on limiting and reducing naval weapons and naval activity is essential.

Taking into account the exceptional urgency of resolving the problems of security on the world's seas and oceans, disarmament, and ecological security, a constituent conference was held in Moscow on 21 June 1990 aimed at creating an independent public organization based on the "Peace to the Oceans" commission—the Soviet Committee for Problems of Peace, Disarmament, and Ecological Security on the Seas and Oceans. It is planned to create the nucleus of a social scientific center for naval problems which will be attached to this committee. The Soviet Association of Maritime Law is making a considerable contribution to the resolution of these problems.

Hence, there are clearly sufficient moral and material preconditions for expanding the ranks of the Soviet supporters of the struggle for securing peace on the seas and oceans, something which should, on the whole, strengthen the international social movement in this vitally important sphere.

One can understand the American people's feeling of national pride in their powerful navy which has been created by their intelligence and labor and also the necessity, dictated by the geostrategic situation, of having strong—to certain limits—naval forces. However, both the American and Soviet people now, as never before, need to assume great responsibility for the development of cooperation between the two great powers in the interests of guaranteeing a dignified life for the whole of mankind. Once such cooperation starts to manifest itself, there is the possibility, on this basis, of guaranteeing, by other means, the security of the commercial sea lines of communication of the United States, the USSR, and all other countries.

The contemporary development of international relations in the world brings to the seas and oceans complex military-political, economic, ecological, and legal problems, the suitable resolution of which requires the presence of an operational instrument of the United Nations.

Permanently operational UN naval forces could serve as such an instrument. The Soviet Union's proposals to create UN naval forces (during the course of the Iranian-Iraqi war) which were elaborated in 1988 and also similar proposals made by the International Chamber of Navigation as well as the decisions of the 15th and 17th international conferences (1989) of "Peace on the Seas" and the first international seminar on limiting the naval

arms race which was held in Moscow in February 1990 confirm the urgent need to examine this question.

It is highly probable that the formulation of the question of immediately creating UN naval forces seemed too categorical to official political circles in the West and, as such, was not given any support. It would possibly be more productive to approach this question in the form of a joint proposal by the USSR and the United States to the UN secretary general for the formation of an international group of experts to investigate the expediency and possibility of creating permanently operational UN naval forces with fairly broad functions. In the course of these investigations, the political, military, economic, and legal aspects of this problem could be examined in their entirety. The results of such investigations could be submitted for consideration to the UN General Assembly. In addition to resolving the problems of guaranteeing the security of international navigation in zones of regional military conflicts and the struggle against increasing piracy and terrorism, problems which have already become ripe, the UN naval forces would play an exceptionally important role in securing the legitimate, safe, and ever increasing economic utilization of the seas and oceans.

UN naval forces would also play an important international political role owing to the fact that the extensive participation in their permanent and precisely organized activities of a large number of states with different levels of political and economic development would contribute to a greater consolidation of the human community on the basis of a common responsibility for a reasonable utilization of the World Ocean.

In conclusion, it should be pointed out that the views of the U.S. military-political leadership on limiting and reducing naval weapons and naval activity are not final and, in view of the military-political and economic realities which are taking shape, they could change in the near future in favor of starting negotiations between the USSR and the United States on the burning problem of reducing confrontation between them at sea.

One can hope that the time will come when the admirals of both sides will put aside the book "War and War" and get down to reading the more useful and outstanding novel "Peace and Peace."

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Review of U.S. Defense Annual

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[Review by L.F. Strok of book "American Defense Annual 1988-1989," edited by Joseph Kruzel, Lexington (Mass.), Lexington Books, 1988, 323 pages]

[Text] The annual describes the results and basic guidelines of military policy in the last years of the Reagan

administration. This is a collective work, consisting of 12 chapters and containing extensive reference material and illustrations, representing a review of American military-strategic policy, its priorities, and the specific methods of their realization. The fourth edition of the annual, just as all previous ones, has been highly commended by American experts. In some higher academic institutions it is even part of the curriculum of defense policy studies.

The work consists of chapters dealing with military strategy, the defense budget, strategic, tactical, and naval forces, the forces and means of strategic troop transfers, personnel, organization and control, and, finally, various aspects of arms control. The edition also includes chapters on crisis management and chapters analyzing the state of affairs in theoretical studies of security issues.

The introduction stresses that the authors did not try to reach a consensus on the issues they discuss. They correctly assumed that no one, as common wisdom now dictates, has a monopoly on the truth, especially in areas as complex as the choice of optimal and preferable military policy guidelines.

The editor of the book and the author of the first chapter, Joseph Kruzel, concentrates on two issues having, in his opinion, the greatest impact on American military policy.

The first is the increasing dissatisfaction of several countries with the U.S. military bases on their territory. Without questioning the need to maintain the United States' broad military commitments, presupposing the maintenance of a diversified network of bases, the author reviews the history of the establishment of the bases, discusses their functional purpose, and suggests possible courses of action to preserve the overseas bases.

The second issue concerns the results of the almost 7 years U.S. Secretary of Defense C. Weinberger was in office. Kruzel says that Weinberger, who led an unprecedented campaign for the buildup of military strength, managed to carry out almost all of his plans better than any of his predecessors, although the very election of Reagan, in the author's opinion, already guaranteed an increase in Pentagon allocations "no matter who would have been appointed secretary of defense" (p 18).

The author sees Weinberger's main shortcoming as a secretary in his decision to base his own activity on the principle of decentralized leadership, after which he was unable to reconcile the conflicting bureaucratic interests of various branches of the armed services and secure their efficient functioning. Kruzel says that the bills for the sometimes imbalanced military programs of Reagan and Weinberger were not submitted immediately, and "when it turns out that there are not enough funds to pay them, some extremely difficult decisions will have to be made" (p 20).

Lawrence Friedman examines the evolution of the Reagan administration's approach to nuclear strategy. The author feels that the investigations stemmed from a

desire to put an end to the genuinely dangerous and flawed concept of "mutual assured destruction." The investigations initially focused on the modernization of several military programs for the sake of strategic advantages and on the elaboration of more detailed scenarios of possible nuclear conflicts. The notorious SDI program was proposed somewhat later and turned out to be quite indefinite even from the technical standpoint. Finally, all of this was followed by investigations of mutually acceptable arms control measures. Friedman feels that Reagan might be the only politician among the American presidents who laid the basis for a comprehensive nuclear arms control framework on the American side.

Lawrence Korb and Stephen Daggett analyze the defense budget and the strategic plans of the Reagan administration in their chapter. Their main conclusion concerns the need for the reordering of priorities in military planning in connection with the upcoming cuts in defense allocations as a result of the huge federal budget deficit. The authors direct special attention to the lack of balance in these programs and their resulting ineffectiveness. It is difficult to restore a disrupted balance and impossible to maintain it without a realistic view of the future, the authors write.

The section of the annual written by Morton Halperin and dealing with future strategic nuclear forces contains some original ideas differing perceptibly from Washington's official military-strategic concepts, and sometimes contradicting them directly. He proposes them in place of the "costly, unpredictable, and destabilizing 'Star Wars,' the dream of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, and the hope that the existing model will continue to avert disaster..." (p 87).

Basing his approach on the idea that nuclear weapons are not weapons in the usual sense of the term, Halperin believes, first of all, that strategic nuclear forces should be removed from the jurisdiction of the military establishment and that a new structure should be created for the management of these forces; second, that the United States should enhance the survivability of its strategic forces and simultaneously reduce the threat to the USSR, consisting in the possibility of a surprise nuclear missile attack. This would require the reorganization of the structure, composition, and disposition of these forces. Third, he feels that the goal in crisis situations consists in securing the survivability of strategic forces, and not their readiness for rapid use. All of this should serve to strengthen the system of "deterrents" to avert the danger of nuclear war.

In light of the debates, which have been going on for over a year now, over the U.S. military contribution to NATO, Richard Kugler tries to substantiate the need for continued American military presence in Europe. After stipulating that this presence is not a goal in itself and that a balanced agreement on USSR and U.S. troop reductions is possible, the author says that a viable collective defense of NATO's European wing can be achieved through the coordination of military programs.

This option could become particularly relevant, in the author's opinion, because collective defense "would reduce the very possibility that the Soviets could count on a quick and decisive victory in a war with conventional arms" (p 103).

The chapters dealing with naval forces and the forces and means of strategic troop transfers contain a detailed analysis of the trends in their development and their potential capabilities, analyze specific situations and conflicts in which they could have been used, and raise questions about their financing.

The book contains a brief review of quantitative and qualitative tendencies in the personnel structure of the armed forces and of debates within the United States over the institution of compulsory military or other service by American citizens. Although the author of this chapter, Charles Moskos, remarks that the voluntary principle of armed forces organization is unlikely to be renounced in the United States in the near future, he directs attention to a new feature in bills introduced in the 100th Congress—the eradication of distinctions in the privileges granted to citizens in military and civil service.

James Loescher presents a detailed account of the attempts to institute radical reforms in the organization and management of the military establishment. These attempts, which began in 1986, were primarily intended to centralize the administration of different branches of the armed services and enhance the role of the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The author comments on the importance of the reforms and stresses the need for their more decisive institution along with some other measures to make the entire process of the management of American armed forces more effective in meeting current requirements. Loescher analyzes the reasons for the resistance of these reforms by some military circles and also stresses the importance of changing Congress' role in military policymaking, because Congress, in his opinion, "lost the ability to set policy goals and guidelines when it became involved in the micromanagement of national defense efforts" (p 188).

Michael Mandelbaum discusses the Reagan administration's approaches to arms control issues at length. Admitting that historians still have a great deal of work to do in the fuller elucidation of the causes of Reagan's recognition of the need to limit nuclear competition with the USSR, Mandelbaum lists some of these causes, especially the realization that the continued accumulation of nuclear weapons would not create political advantages and that the consequences of nuclear war would not validate a single political goal. Using the ideas of "game theory" and building a mathematical and logical model of the strategic deadlock, the author concludes that cooperation—i.e., arms control—was the most convenient way out of the situation for both sides.

Charles Harmon examines the problem of maintaining stability in crisis situations. He puts it at the top of the

hierarchy of strategic priorities. He views the establishment of the Moscow and Washington centers for the reduction of the nuclear threat, the signing of the INF Treaty, and the measures the United States took to improve the command, control, communication and intelligence system as proof of the realization that the greatest danger of nuclear war stemmed precisely from instability in a crisis situation. The author proposes specific measures which will, in his opinion, lead to a situation providing the USSR and the United States with serious reasons not to resort to military force, even when their vital interests are threatened.

Harmon believes, however, that in spite of recent moves, the possibility of maintaining stability in crisis situations is diminishing. Some of the reasons are the characteristics of some new types of strategic weapons, the measures to reduce the amount of time required to put strategic forces on alert, the vulnerability of the entire system for the control of nuclear forces, and some military-strategic plans.

In the last chapter Joseph Nye analyzes the state of affairs in theoretical studies of international security issues. After a brief review of the history of these studies and a definition of the term "international security," he lists some of the basic problems interfering with the successful development of these studies and discusses some of the main trends in this field. In the author's opinion, the main inhibiting factor is the attempt to equate the broader studies of international security with studies of strategic security, where the theory of nuclear deterrence prevails. Nye says that the key objective in international security research is the "creation of intellectual capital for a more complex future" (p 243).

The generally impartial and realistic approach of the authors to American defense issues contributes to a better objective understanding of the problems that will have to be solved by U.S. military policymakers.

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Articles Not Translated

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